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"Yuan(缘)" is an important part of Chinese traditional culture, it not only laid 
the foundation of the Chinese intimate relationships, but also profoundly affects the 
principle of interpersonal interaction, it plays an important role in corporate 
governance as a kind of informal institutional. Among them, "hometown complex" is 
widespread in managers of Chinese listed company. According to the hand collected 
id information of Chairmen and general managers in Chinese listed companies over 
the 2004-2014 period, I find that there is about 47% of the firm-year observations 
that the chairman and general manager belong to the same county, and about 61% 
share the same branch of sub-dialect. Existing research discuss a lot about 
hometown complex and agency problems. However, so far, academic have not 
systematically studied the economic consequence, and the conclusion is still unified. 
As the foundation of utility of regional network is also the way people get along with. 
I choose interpersonal principles as a point cut, study the influence of relationship 
between the chairman and general manager on explicit and implicit agency problem 
in the framework of relational contracts. 
The main conclusions of my paper are as follows: firstly, the geo-relation 
between Chairman and general manager significantly reduced the company's 
financial fraud, and this effect is strengthened as to narrowing the scope of home. At 
the same time, off-site work also have the same effect. The results show that the 
geo-relation between Chairman and general manager has positive influence on 
explicit agency problem. This study also differentiates firms located in provinces 
with high MKT indexes from those located in provinces with low MKT indexes, and 
then conducts subsample tests. The results show that positive influence on explicit 
agency problem only stands for the subsample with MKT indexes. Secondly, the 
geo-relation between Chairman and general manager significantly reduced the 
company's cash holdings levels, narrowing the scope of home and off-site work can 
strengthen this effect. The results again prove that the geo-relation between 













But this effect only stands for the subsample with law legal environment. Thirdly, 
the geo-relation between Chairman and general manager significantly reduce the 
risk-taking of the company (Earnings volatility or R&D Investment). It suggests that 
the geo-relation between Chairman and general manager has negative effects to the 
implicit agency problem. But the negative effect of the geo-relation on the 
risk-taking is only valid for non-SOEs, but not for SOEs. These indicate that the 
policy burdens, supervision and incentive mechanism of state-owned company will 
weaken the effectiveness of the hometown complex between Chairman and CEO. 
This paper verifies the effects of the geo-relation between Chairman and 
general manager in aspects of financial fraud, corporate cash holdings, and 
risk-taking (Earnings volatility and R&D Investment). This paper also provides 
further empirical evidence for the economic consequences of the geo-relation 
between Chairman and general manager. The study find that the impact of the 
hometown complex on corporate governance has two sides, the positive side and the 
negative side. These conclusions will be helpful for listed companies’ staffing 
governance improving and decision-making, etc. 
The study’s potential theoretical contributions are: firstly, According to the two 
kinds of measurement methods of the hometown complex—the formal 
administrative division and the informal sub-dialect, this paper studies the 
governance role of the geo-relation between Chairman and general manager based 
on a more broad perspective; Secondly, I distinguish the type of agency problems, 
find that the geo-relation between Chairman and general manager has positive 
governance effects on explicit agency problem, and negative effects on implicit 
agency problem; Thirdly, this paper provides a new perspective for explaining 
financial fraud , corporate cash holdings, and risk-taking. 
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两套标准编制表 1-1 和图 1-1。其中，表 1-1 为老标准下 2006 年至 2014 年中国
投资者保护的法律环境。共四项指数，总指数投资者保护力度指数和三项分指
数披露程度指数、董事责任程度指数、股东诉讼便利度指数，评分区间为 0 到
10。由表 1 可以看出，从 2006 年至 2014 年投资者保护的法律环境得到了明显
的改善，总指数投资者保护力度指数的评分由 2.4 上升到 5.0，世界排名由 164
位上升至 100 位。三项分指数，披露程度指数、董事责任程度指数和投资者保
护力度指数在 2006 年至 2014 年期间都有所改善。其中披露程度指数最为明显，
评分现已达到满分 10，优于绝大数国家，但董事责任程度指数和投资者保护力
度指数仅略有提高，前者由 0.6 上涨到 1.0，后者由 1.1 上涨至 4.0，仍低于绝大
数国家。 
 
表 1-1 投资者保护的法律环境  
 披露程度指数  董事责任程度指数  股东诉讼便利度指数  投资者保护力度指数 
年份 评分 排名  评分 排名  评分 排名  评分 排名 
2006 5.5 64  0.6 164  1.1 166  2.4 164 
2007 5.5 67  0.6 169  2.2 159  2.8 158 
2008 5.5 70  0.6 171  2.2 161  2.8 162 
2009 5.5 72  0.6 173  2.2 162  2.8 165 
2010 5.5 76  0.6 175  2.2 164  2.8 166 
2011 5.5 78  0.6 175  2.2 164  2.8 169 
2012 5.5 83  0.6 177  2.2 166  2.8 173 
2013 5.5 85  0.6 180  2.2 170  2.8 175 
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